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Abstract
In this paper we propose a time-varying parameter VAR model for the housing
market in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Euro Area. For
these four economies, we answer the following research questions: (i) How can we
evaluate the stance of monetary policy when the policy rate hits the zero lower
bound? (ii) Can developments in the housing market still be explained by policy
measures adopted by central banks? (iii) Did central banks succeed in mitigating
the detrimental impact of the financial crisis on selected housing variables? We
analyze the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and the hous-
ing markets by using the shadow interest rate estimated by Krippner (2013b).
Our findings suggest that the monetary policy transmission mechanism to the
housing market has not changed with the implementation of quantitative easing
or forward guidance, and central banks can affect the composition of an investors
portfolio through investment in housing. A counterfactual exercise provides some
evidence that unconventional monetary policy has been particularly successful
in dampening the consequences of the financial crisis on housing markets in the
United States, while the effects are more muted in the other countries considered
in this study.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of housing prices and household leverage, for instance measured by the
debt-to-income ratio, have played an important role in the recent financial crisis that
pushed many advanced economies into a deep recession. Low interest rates and loose
lending standards in the run-up to the financial crisis contributed to a sharp build-up
in household debt. The sudden collapse of housing prices translated into a significant
deleveraging process, which has been a major obstacle for the economic recovery that
followed the worst recession since the great depression. During tranquil time periods,
increasing house prices amplify the net worth of households, boosting household con-
sumption and private investments. On the other hand, house price declines lift the
level of indebtedness, yielding a situation where outstanding household debt suddenly
exceeds property values. Within the recent financial crisis, many households experi-
enced a sudden drop of their wealth relative to their debt, facing severe difficulties
to fulfill their mortgage payments and other financial obligations, despite being in an
environment of extraordinary low interest rates.1 The first two rows of Fig. 1 depict
real house prices and mortgage indebtedness for the United States (US), the United
Kingdom (UK), Japan (JP) and the Euro Area (EA). Apparently, both quantities dis-
play negative growth rates since 2007, providing some evidence for the poor conditions
housing markets reached in that period. Declining house prices, a sharp deleveraging
process and the following recession forced all major central banks to reduce short-term
interest rates to historically low levels. Japan provides a different view. Japanese real
estate values experienced a massive boom during the ’80s, peaking in 1990, followed by
a sharp decline in housing and property prices.2 Since then, housing prices have been
declining continuously. Mortgage indebtedness increased markedly during the housing
boom, but remained stable after the burst of the housing bubble. The third row of
Fig. 1 presents the policy rate in the four countries/regions, where it can be seen that
across the globe, interest rates reached the zero-lower bound (ZLB) in the beginning of
2009.3
[Fig. 1 about here.]
As a reaction to the ongoing economic slump, central banks noted that a re-balancing
procedure for households’ balance sheets is important to promote a quick recovery.
However, with nominal interest rates close to zero, conventional monetary policy tools
that aim to promote economic growth became ineffective.4 Thus several central banks
adopted so-called unconventional monetary policy tools to steer the economy back to-
wards a balanced growth path. Such unconventional monetary policy tools span a wide
1The huge decline in housing prices and housing net worth are one of the shocks that pulled the
economy into recession (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2014).
2For Japan, land price and house price are used interchangeably.
3The first quantitative easing experiment for Japan finds its roots in 2001.
4 Ngo (2015) finds that in the presence of the zero lower bound amplifies the house price decline
when the economy is hit by adverse credit shocks.
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variety of methods such as credit and quantitative easing or signalling.5 Several central
banks have been very active since the beginning of the crisis and their actions helped
the financial sector to avoid a complete collapse. The US Federal Reserve (Fed), the
Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) have implemented quantitative
easing programs with large-scale asset purchases to exert a positive impact on financial
variables as well as on output and inflation. By contrast, the European Central Bank
(ECB) has introduced measures to ensure provision of liquidity needed by the banking
sector in order to repair the bank-lending channel. Table B.1 summarizes the main
actions taken by the Fed, the BoE, the BoJ and the ECB in terms on unconventional
monetary policy. Each action translates into an expansion of the central banks’ balance
sheet, providing several stimuli to dampen the global economic slowdown.
Since the policy rate is typically stuck at zero or near zero, such unconventional
monetary policy measures are not reflected in short-term interest rates. This proves to
be one of the main challenges for understanding and describing the stance of monetary
policy.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between the stance of monetary policy
and the housing markets during periods of the ZLB for the US, the UK, JP and the EA.
The motivation to review the role of the housing market and monetary policy during
the ZLB is threefold.
First, we want to evaluate if developments in the housing market, i.e. changes in
housing prices and mortgage lending, can still be explained by policy measures adopted
by central banks. As a central research objective we evaluate whether unconventional
monetary policy succeeded in mitigating the collapse of house prices and lending activ-
ities. For this purpose we propose a time-varying vector autoregressive model coupled
with stochastic volatility (TVP-VAR-SV) for the housing market. Our model closely re-
sembles the specifications proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005)
with some minor differences. With respect to the choice of the covariates, we include
information on prices, consumption, interest rates that constitute a standard macroe-
conomic model commonly employed to investigate monetary policy. In addition, we
include quantities related to housing markets to analyze the dynamic properties of
housing markets with respect to unconventional monetary policy. To investigate the
relationship between unconventional policy actions and the dynamic responses of sev-
eral key macroeconomic quantities we include a measure of the monetary policy stance.
More specifically, we follow Krippner (2012; 2013a;b) and include the shadow rate,
which is constructed by adding an explicit function of maturity to the shadow rate
forward curve.6 The final row of Fig. 1 depicts the shadow rate for all countries under
scrutiny. Note that the shadow rates reflect accommodative monetary policy due to
unconventional policy measures adopted by various central banks since the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. However, while the shadow rate in the US, the UK and Japan has been
5Signalling can be used to steer market expectations towards lower interest rates in the future. For
example, during the credit crisis of 2008, the US Federal Reserve indicated interest rates would be low
for an ”extended period”.
6Alternative measures are offered by Wu and Xia (2015) and Lombardi and Zhu (2014).
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decreasing since 2008, shadow rates in the EA indicated expansionary monetary policy
actions only since 2011.
Second, we quantify the likely impact of unconventional monetary policy by perform-
ing several simple counterfactual experiments. To this end we ”zero-out” the structural
coefficients of the monetary policy rule and investigate what would have happened if
the central bank was indeed constrained by the ZLB. Our findings suggest that for
all economies under consideration, unconventional monetary policy actions helped to
mitigate the detrimental impact of the financial crisis on several macroeconomic quanti-
ties. More specifically, unconventional monetary policy increased inflation, consumption
growth, housing prices and residential investment. Moreover, it also provided at least
some liquidity to the private sector.
Finally, we assess the quality of the shadow rate proposed by Krippner (2012),
Krippner (2013a) and Krippner (2013b) as a trustable measure to investigate uncon-
ventional monetary policy. Using an identification scheme based on Baumeister and
Benati (2013), which assumes that the central bank is effectively trying to reduce long-
term yields while operating at the ZLB, we find that our results are qualitatively in-line
with other procedures typically adopted in the literature. This results holds true for
all countries under consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section
3 presents the time-varying parameter VAR model and the corresponding prior setup.
Section 4 provides a brief information on the dataset employed, the identification of the
structural model and presents the main results of the paper. Section 5 describes the
counterfactual experiments while Section 6 documents additional information concern-
ing the robustness of our findings. Finally, the last Section concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the recent contributions of Krippner (2013a), Wu and Xia (2015)
and Baumeister and Benati (2013) that aim to evaluate monetary policy when the ZLB
is reached. Since recessions that occurred as a reaction to large drops in housing and
property prices tended to be deeper in countries and regions where house price declines
have been comparatively larger (Mian and Sufi, 2011), we put a particular focus on
housing markets and assess whether unconventional monetary policy has helped to
re-balance households’ balance sheets and avoid a even stronger housing burst.
Krippner (2013b) proposed an approximation for the instantaneous forward rate
in continuous-time, using the implied shadow overnight rate as a metric for the ac-
tual stance of monetary policy. Wu and Xia (2015) estimate a factor-augmented VAR
(FAVAR) model where the shadow rate is constructed as a linear function of three
latent variables called factors and find that the effects of the shadow rate on macroe-
conomic variables are similar to those of federal funds rate. Moreover, Wu and Xia
(2015) find that the unconventional monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve
was successful in reducing the unemployment rate in December 2013 by 0.13% com-
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pared to a situation where monetary policy exclusively utilized conventional tools.7 We
extend Krippner (2013a) and Wu and Xia (2015) by studying the case of the housing
market and analyze the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the four coun-
tries/regional aggregates mentioned above. Moreover, we assess the quality of their
approach by evaluating whether the impulse responses obtained are qualitatively simi-
lar to responses obtained by using the approach put forward in Baumeister and Benati
(2013). In that contribution, they estimate a time-varying parameter structural VAR
model for the US and the UK and identify a pure spread shock to investigate the re-
sponses of macroeconomic aggregates to declining long-term yield spreads induced by
central banks bond purchase programs during the ZLB. They find that measures of
unconventional monetary policy in both the US and the UK have helped avoiding a
strong deflation and have boosted employment.
Finally, the present paper is also related to Walentin (2014) who estimates a struc-
tural VAR model incorporating important quantities related to housing markets and
shows that mortgage spread shocks are quantitatively important for the real economy.
Moreover, Walentin (2014) shows that central banks’ asset purchases in mortgage mar-
kets have been very successful in affecting the mortgage spread, and led to a sizeable
effect on aggregate quantities and property prices.
Different approaches have been studied to quantitatively evaluate the impact of
unconventional monetary policy. Meaning and Zhu (2011; 2012) study the size and ma-
turity of Treasury securities holdings and actual asset purchases to evaluate the effects
of unconventional monetary policy and find that quantitative easing has lowered the
10-year Treasury yield by approximately 180 basis points. Chung, Laforte, Reifschnei-
der, and Williams (2012) developed a large-scale macroeconomic model showing that
the expansion in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has helped to avoid a rise in the
unemployment rate that would have occurred in the absence of unconventional mone-
tary policy. Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011) and Chen, Cu´rdia, and
Ferrero (2012) developed medium-sized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with a ZLB on nominal interest rates8 and obtained similar results as in Chung,
Laforte, Reifschneider, and Williams (2012). For the EA, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin
(2010) gauge the effectiveness of an unconventional monetary policy intervention with
a decline in spread rates, but found that the economic stimulus occur only with a con-
siderable delay. Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2014) estimate a panel VAR for
eight advanced economies to analyze the impact of an increase in central banks’ balance
sheets at the zero lower bound on economic activity and consumer prices. They find
that output and prices increase in the US, the UK and the EA due to unconventional
monetary policy during crisis periods.
7Lombardi and Zhu (2014) also construct a shadow interest rate for the US by estimating a dynamic
factor model where term structure, monetary aggregates and balance sheet variables are taken into
account. They also find that the Federal Reserve generated sizable stimulus to the economy during
the zero lower bound.
8Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012) use the US term and corporate spreads to proxy the Federal
Reserves policy measures and analyse the global impact of quantitative easing.
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Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the role of housing prices for
business cycle fluctuations and the effect of monetary policy on asset prices. Iacoviello
(2005) estimates a small-scale VAR model and simulates the effects of monetary policy
shocks on several macroeconomic quantities. He finds that nominal prices, real housing
prices and output tend to decrease with respect to a restrictive monetary policy shock.
Similarly, Musso, Neri, and Stracca (2011) estimate a structural VAR model incorporat-
ing the housing market for the US and the EA.9 They find that monetary policy shocks
in the US tend to have a deeper impact on housing markets, relative to the reactions
observed for the EA. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) estimate a fixed-effects panel VAR
for 17 industrialized countries and show that there exist a significant link between house
prices, monetary variables and the macroeconomy. Den Haan and Sterk (2011) estimate
a structural VAR including residential investment and mortgages loans, but they ex-
clude housing prices. However, they find that macroeconomic variables tend to exhibit
co-movement with respect to monetary policy shocks. All aforementioned studies relied
on identification based on a simple Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance
matrix.
By contrast, Jarocin´ski and Smets (2008) use a mixture of zero and sign restrictions
to identify monetary policy shocks and find that a persistent 25 basis point tightening
of the policy rate yields a negative effect not only on real GDP and the GDP deflator,
but also on housing investments and house prices.10 Vargas-Silva (2008) and Sa´ and
Wieladek (2015) estimate a VAR model by restricting output and the price level to be
non-negative for an expansionary monetary shock, while leaving the housing variables
unrestricted.11 They find that house prices and residential investments increase as a
result of an expansionary monetary policy shock.12
3 The econometric framework
In the following section we briefly outline the econometric methodology employed
and discuss the prior specification and the corresponding Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm.
3.1 The time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic volatility
Assume that the dynamics of a N -dimensional vector of macroeconomic quantities yt
may be well described by the following dynamic model
yt = A1tyt−1 + · · ·+ Aptyt−p + ut, (3.1)
9For a similar setup of VAR estimation with the housing market, see Lambertini, Mendicino, and
Punzi (2013) and Punzi and Kauko (2015).
10Uhlig (2005) offers a wide-ranging discussion on VAR identification with sign restrictions.
11For similar results on restricting output and prices to identify monetary policy shocks, see Canova
and De Nicolo (2002).
12Sa´ and Wieladek (2015) use sign restrictions in an open economy framework.
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where, for the sake of simplicity, we omit any deterministic terms. The N × N -
dimensional matrices of autoregressive coefficients are denoted by Ajt (j = 1, . . . , p)
and ut ∼ N (0,Σt) is a normally distributed vector white noise error term with time-
varying variance-covariance matrix Σt.
We can rewrite Eq. (3.1) more compactly as
yt = (IN ⊗ x′t)αt + ut, (3.2)
with xt = (y
′
t−1, . . . , y
′
t−p)
′ and αt = vec{(A1t, . . . , Apt)} where vec denotes the vector-
ization operator. Consistent with the literature on TVP-SV-VARs (Cogley and Sargent,
2005; Primiceri, 2005; Baumeister and Benati, 2013) we assume that αt evolves accord-
ing to
αt = αt−1 + vt, (3.3)
where vt ∼ N (0, V ) is a vector of white noise innovations and V is a K×K-dimensional
variance-covariance matrix withK = N×(Np). Equation (3.3) is called a state equation
that describes the law of motion for the latent states αt while Eq. (3.1) is called a
observation equation that relates the states to the observed quantities.
We can factorize the variance-covariance matrix of ut as
Σt = QtHtQ
′
t. (3.4)
Let Qt be a N ×N -dimensional lower triangular matrix with diag(Qt) = ιN and ιN =
(1, . . . , 1)′ is aN -dimensional vector of ones. Furthermore,Ht = diag(exp{h1t}, . . . , exp{hNt})
is a matrix of volatilities.
After collecting the free elements of Qt in a M =
N×(N−1)
2
-dimensional vector qt we
assume that qt evolves according to
qt = qt−1 + et. (3.5)
Here we let et ∼ N (0, S) with S being aM×M -dimensional variance-covariance matrix.
To complete the model we assume that the vector of log-volatilities ht = (h1t, . . . , hNt)
′
follows an autoregressive process of order one,
ht = µ+ Ξ(ht−1 − µ) + ηt, (3.6)
where µ = (µ1, . . . , µN)
′ is a vector of intercepts, Ξ = diag(ξ1, . . . , ξN) is a N × N
matrix of autoregressive coefficients and ηt ∼ N (0,Ω) is a white noise error with Ω =
diag(ω1, . . . , ωN). Equation (3.6) implies that the log-volatilities are described by a
stationary stochastic process, as opposed to all other coefficients in the model. This
choice is predicated by the fact that assuming random walk behaviour for the log-
volatility would translate into an excessively explosive behaviour of the volatilities when
time approaches infinity.
Equations (3.1) to (3.6) describe a state-space system that provides a great deal
of flexibility when it comes to describing the dynamic relationship between monetary
7
policy and housing markets. Since all parameters are allowed to change over time, our
model captures any potential time variation along two important dimensions. First,
since linear VARs assume that the data-generating process remained stable over the
estimation period it is effectively ruled out that transmission mechanisms changed
over time. Our specification accounts for this by assuming that the autoregressive
parameters change dynamically, thus capturing possible structural breaks (Koop, Leon-
Gonzalez, and Strachan, 2009). Second, several studies provide ample evidence that
the volatility of macroeconomic shocks changed over time (Sims and Zha, 2006; Prim-
iceri, 2005). Our specification of the variance-covariance matrix thus incorporates this
evidence by assuming that the volatilities evolve smoothly over time.
3.2 Prior setup and posterior simulation
We estimate the model described by Eqs. (3.1) to (3.6) using Bayesian methods. Our
prior setup is a modified variant of the specification adopted by Primiceri (2005). More
specifically, we impose the following set of priors on the coefficients of our model.
• Autoregressive coefficients: p(β0) ∼ N (βˆ, Θˆβ) and V ∼ IW(v0, V 0)
• Simultaneous relationships: p(q0) ∼ N (qˆ, Θˆq) and S ∼ IW(s0, Sq)
• Stochastic volatilities: p(h0) ∼ N (0, 10×IN), p(µj) ∼ N (0, 102) and p(ξj+1/2) ∼
B(25, 5) for j = 1, . . . , N
where we follow Primiceri (2005) and set βˆ and qˆ equal to the maximum likelihood
estimate over the first 30 observations and Θˆβ and Θˆq equal to four times the vari-
ance of the maximum likelihood estimator. The priors for V and S are calibrated by
setting V = k2V × Θˆβ, S = k2S × Θˆq and v0 = s0 = 30 with k2V = k2S = 0.01 thus
being fairly conservative on the degree of time-variation.13 Finally, our prior setup for
the coefficients of the state equation of the log-volatilities closely follows Kastner and
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2014).
We estimate the model using the algorithm put forth in Primiceri (2005) with one
important exception. Due to superior convergence characteristics we simulate the full-
history of log-volatilities through the algorithm put forward in Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter (2014) and subsequently applied in a global VAR model by Huber (2016).14
For the final results we use 30,000 iterations of our MCMC algorithm and thin the
corresponding chain such that inference is effectively based on 5,000 draws from the
joint posterior of the parameters of the model.
13Since the priors on V and S are typically quite influential, we have performed a battery of robust-
ness checks with respect to the hyperparameters of the priors, yielding results that are qualitatively
similar across countries and variables.
14This step is implemented by means of the excellent R package stochvol, which is available on
CRAN (Kastner, 2014)
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4 Data and Results
In this Section we first provide a brief description of the data and the identification
strategy adopted. The second subsection presents the impulse response functions (IRFs)
to a 25 basis points (bps) increase in the shadow interest rate for the US, the UK, JP
and the EA, respectively. Finally, we present the findings of our robustness analysis
where unconventional monetary policy is analyzed by means of the identification scheme
outlined in Baumeister and Benati (2013).
4.1 Data and Identification
We include the following variables in our model: the quarterly growth rates of real
consumption (RCC), the consumer price index (P), real residential investments (RIH),
the real house price index (HPI), and the level of the shadow federal interest rate
(Shadow rate). For the spread shock we also include the short-term interest rate for
the US (SR). Thus all variables except shadow rates and term spreads are included in
first (log) differences.15 All data are taken at quarterly frequency from 1980 until 2014.
Note that since the shadow rate is typically not observed and is estimated from the
data, we completely ignore any estimation uncertainty surrounding the point estimate
of the shadow interest rate. However, this proves to be only a minor shortcoming
since a broad body of literature on the estimation of factor-augmented VAR models
(Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; Korobilis, 2013) reports only minor differences
between impulse responses obtained when the factors are treated as latent variables or
as observed quantities (approximated through principal components). We identify the
monetary policy shock by imposing the set of sign restrictions shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
The identifying restrictions imposed for the aggregate demand (AD) and supply
(AS) shock are standard in the literature. We assume that a (negative) AD shock
lowers consumption growth, inflation and the shadow rate. By contrast, a positive
AS also decreases consumption growth but increases inflation and the shadow rate on
impact. For the unconventional monetary policy shock we follow Musso, Neri, and
Stracca (2011), who identify a conventional monetary policy shock based on a similar
collection of sign restrictions. More specifically, we assume that consumption growth
and inflation falls while the shadow rate increases. Moreover we also assume that house
prices, residential investment and real household debt declines.
In the robustness section we will exchange the shadow rate with the short-term
interest rate and, in addition, include the term spread. We calculate the term spread
as the difference between 10-year long-term government bond yields and the short-term
interest rate and use it to identify unconventional monetary policy, following Baumeister
and Benati (2013) and Walentin (2014). The sign restrictions imposed closely mirror
the ones presented in Table 1. However, we also identify a spread shock, where we
15Details can be found in Appendix A.1.
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assume that the same restrictions hold as in the case of the UMP shock. Moreover, we
also identify a conventional monetary policy shock that introduces the restriction that
the term spread increases on impact.
4.2 The dynamic effects of unconventional monetary policy
Figure 2 depicts the posterior median of the impulse responses for the US to a 25
bp unconventional monetary policy shock. An increase of the shadow rate generates
a decrease in housing prices, residential investment, consumption, CPI and mortgage
lending. This occurs because a contractionary monetary policy shock will most likely
increase the shadow value of borrowing by increasing the future service cost of debt,
which in turn has a negative impact on the level of mortgage lending. Such an in-
crease in the shadow value of borrowing will negatively affect consumption via the
wealth/collateral channel.
Looking at the time profile of the IRFs reveals that the magnitude of the impact is
sensitive to the selection of the horizon for which the restrictions hold. The responses
to a monetary policy shock display significant time variation on impact, and the impact
is especially pronounced during the period covering the recent financial crisis. This is
simply due to the fact that the stochastic volatility specification is flexible enough to
account for the changing volatility and this directly influences the impact magnitudes
of the impulse responses.
Inspection of variables related to housing markets reveals pronounced effects of un-
conventional monetary policy on all housing market quantities under consideration,
particularly residential investments and housing prices.16 This occurs because house
price fluctuations directly affect residential investment, as the change in house prices
shifts Tobin’s q for residential investment, i.e. the value of housing relative to construc-
tion costs. If, for instance, house prices increase and exceed the construction costs, then
residential investment increases as well. Moreover, the value of land and dwellings can
be used as collateral and this affects the ability of firms to borrow, boosting their in-
vestment opportunity and leading to stronger economic growth. Fluctuations in the net
worth of firms due to changes in house values will amplify the impact of macroeconomic
shocks and give rise to a well-known financial accelerator mechanism.17
[Fig. 2 about here.]
To provide some evidence on the statistical significance of our results we also report
information on the shape of the posterior distribution of impulse responses in Fig. 3.
The figure presents responses that have been averaged across three selected time periods:
1990Q4 to 2007Q4, representing the period prior to the recent global financial crisis,
2008Q1 to 2009Q2 marking the period of the financial crisis and 2009Q3 to 2013Q1
16Similar results are found in Erceg and Levin (2006), Vargas-Silva (2008) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2008).
17For details see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki, Moore, et al. (1997).
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serving as a post-crisis period. All figures report median responses along with the 16th
(25th) and 84th (75th) credible sets in light (dark) orange across time, starting from
1990Q1, and for a 14 quarter horizon.
The residential investment response is quite large, with a maximum mean negative
effect of about 12 percent deviation from baseline on impact in 1990 and of about
seven percent around in 2009 and 2014. The impact on house price shows a maximum
response after the third quarter in 1990, but a slightly smaller response in 2009 and
2014. Mortgage lending also exhibits a certain amount of time variation from 1990 to
2009 and 2014. In addition, the responses of mortgage lending appear to be rather
persistent.
The effects of monetary policy shocks on house prices, mortgage lending and con-
sumption also increased over time. The sensitivity of house prices and mortgage lending
to tightening monetary policy depends on the overall increase in households indebted-
ness in the US. Carroll and Dunn (1997) have studied the relationship between the
growth rate of household debt and consumption in durable goods and find a positive
and significant relationship between these variables. Such relationship arises from pre-
cautionary motives where highly leveraged households are more sensitive to uncertainty
about current and future income and they are more likely to decrease consumption on
durable goods when adverse shocks hit the economy. It is worth noting that the re-
sponses of house prices to monetary policy shocks depicts two important sharp changes,
which coincide with three US recessions: 1990/1991, 2000/2001 and 2007 to 2009. Be-
tween the first two recessions, housing price responses have been quite stable, but
steadily increased after the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000.
Our findings for the US are generally in concordance with the literature. Similar
results are provided in Jarocin´ski and Smets (2008), Goodhart and Hofmann (2008),
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Erceg and Levin (2006), McCarthy, Peach, et al. (2002),
Vargas-Silva (2008) and Musso, Neri, and Stracca (2011). The exception is the be-
haviour of prices. The specification of our model helps to avoid the well-known “price
puzzle” (Sims, 1992), and the CPI declines on impact in response to a monetary policy
tightening.
[Fig. 3 about here.]
Figure 4 reports responses to a 25 basis points increase in the shadow interest rate
for the UK. The results tend to be similar to the ones obtained for the US, but less
persistent. While the general pattern that responses are stronger within the recent
financial crisis holds for some variables under scrutiny, this finding is less pronounced
as compared to our findings for the US. The impact on housing market variables is
particularly pronounced during the late 1990s and 2004, periods where house prices
increased at their fastest pace because of extraordinary low policy and mortgage rates,
boosting mortgage lending of new borrowers. In addition, responses of inflation suggest
that prices decrease on impact but tend to increase after two quarters, thus producing
a price puzzle. The impact on housing variables is lower in 2009 and 2014. Figure 5
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shows that all responses are rather short-lived, becoming insignificant after one to two
quarters.
[Fig. 4 about here.]
[Fig. 5 about here.]
Figures 6 and 7 depict the responses of several macroeconomic quantities for Japan.
All variables display negative reactions with respect to a 25 basis points increase in
the Japanese shadow rate. Figure 7clearly shows that house prices have been more
responsive to monetary policy until 1990, the year that marked the peak of the housing
bubble, turning less responsive afterwards. After the collapse of the Japanse real estate
market in the early 1990s, the BOJ did not react to worsening conditions by becoming
increasingly expansionary, implementing standard and non-standard monetary policy
more aggressively. Residential investment and inflation show more variability in their
response, relative to other variables. Residential investments are typically identified
as important drivers of the Japanese current account surplus. In order to reduce the
large trade surplus and the risk of protectionism abroad, the Japanese authorities have
implemented several housing subsidies, housing regulations and land use policies to
promote residential investments, improving the existing stock of houses and avoid an
excess current account surplus (see, for instance, Matsuyama, 1990). Therefore, the
response of residential investments has been more volatile relative to other housing
variables, reflecting several policies implemented by the Japanese Government, besides
various QE actions.
[Fig. 6 about here.]
[Fig. 7 about here.]
Finally, Figs. 8 and 9 report responses for the EA. Residential investments are
omitted because the data is available only since 1995, and inclusion of this time series
would thus seriously shorten the available sample. Similar to the UK and the US,
an increase in the shadow interest rate by 25 basis points generates a decrease in
housing prices, consumption, CPI and mortgage lending. Responses of housing prices
and mortgage lending exhibit significant time variation, in particular during the late
1990s and in the midst of the 2000s. Mortgage rates in the EA have been declining
considerably since the 1990s. Changes in EU regulations, financial innovations and
competition in financial markets can be traced back to be among the main determinants
of declining mortgage rates. However, changes in other market rates, including the
policy rate, are generally perceived to be the main reason for the pronounced decline
in mortgage rates. Moreover, the intensified convergence process also led to declining
interest rates. In addition, the responses of housing variables, consumption and prices
are strongest within these two time periods.
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Differently from the US and the UK, the impact on housing variables tends to be
stronger towards the end of the sample. This reflects the fact the the ECB has imple-
mented forward guidance policies with different time periods relative to the US and the
UK. The overall magnitudes of the responses are, however, much lower as compared to
the US or the UK. This somewhat weaker response could be due to the fact that the
individual member states of the EA tend to be less integrated. Since the sovereign debt
crisis engulfed the EA in 2010, financial fragmentation has become a major obstacle
to a successful implementation of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy actions.
Altavilla, Giannone, and Lenza (2014) report that the ECB’s unconventional monetary
policy actions have lowered government bond yields by around 200 basis points, signif-
icantly impacting credit and GDP growth in Italy and Spain, whereas for France and
Germany the effects are rather muted.
[Fig. 8 about here.]
[Fig. 9 about here.]
To sum up, the overall results are consistent with Musso, Neri, and Stracca (2011)
who find that the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock on housing variables
is significantly larger in the US than in the UK and the EA. Moreover, the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy to the housing market has not changed with the
implementation of unconventional monetary policy.
4.3 Robustness Check
The previous analysis reports the IRFs with respect to an unconventional monetary
policy shock when the Krippner (2013b) index is used. This implies that we focus on
a broader measure of unconventional monetary policy, which can not be interpreted in
classical terms as a monetary policy reaction function.
To assess whether shadow rates prove to be a good alternative to other identification
procedures based on the term spread, we contrast the findings of Subsection 4.2 with
the responses obtained by simulating a 25 basis points spread shock. This implies that
we identify a “pure term spread” shock, similar to Baumeister and Benati (2013) and
Walentin (2014). Monetary policy shocks at the ZLB are broadly defined as shocks
to the long-term yield or to the long-term yield spread.18 However, this approach can
be criticized because more emphasis should be put on the effect of the spread of other
asset yields like the mortgage spread or the risk spread.19
To recover the structural form of our model we use the identification scheme de-
scribed in the lower part of Table 1. We identify a pure spread shock by assuming that
18See also Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) and Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis
(2012).
19Walentin (2014) uses the 30-year Conventional Mortgage Rate relative to the average of the 5-year
and the 10-year Treasury bond rate, in order to isolate the term premia given the longer maturity of
mortgage loans. His estimate finds that 100 basis-points increase in mortgage spread leads to a decline
in consumption, residential investment and house prices.
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the short-term interest rate reacts sluggishly with respect to a monetary policy shock
and the term spread falls on impact. The remaining restrictions on the housing market
variables mirror the ones presented for the UMP shock. Since we are interested in how
monetary policy operates at the ZLB, we closely follow Baumeister and Benati (2013)
and ”zero-out” the structural coefficients of the monetary policy rule to capture the
notion that the central bank is unable to lower nominal interest rates below zero. This
is imposed for the first eight quarters after the UMP shock hit the economy.
Figure 10 presents the responses for the US. We find that a pure term spread shock
leads to a decrease in housing prices, residential investment, consumption, CPI and
mortgage lending. Results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3. Looking at the time profile of the impulses reveals that apart from being of
comparable magnitudes, the shape also looks remarkably similar between these two
measures of unconventional monetary policy. For the EA and the UK the results also
tend to be very similar to the ones based on the Krippner index. Thus, for the sake of
brevity we do not include them in the paper.20
The striking similarity between the results obtained by estimating a TVP-VAR
coupled with the shadow rate and the approach put forward by Baumeister and Be-
nati (2013) and Walentin (2014) provides some evidence that the shadow interest rate
proposed by Krippner (2013b) is a trustable measure to investigate unconventional
monetary policy.
[Fig. 10 about here.]
5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the stance of monetary policy by performing a simple
counterfactual exercise. We simulate a counterfactual path for all variables in the VAR
system based on the notion that central banks remained inactive in the wake of the
financial crisis, i.e. had not implemented unconventional monetary policy measures like
quantitative easing or forward guidance and simply kept the policy rate at the ZLB.
To this end we “zero-out” the structural coefficients of the equation associated with
the shadow rate and investigate what would have happened if the central bank was
indeed constrained by the ZLB. It is worth noting that manipulating the structural co-
efficients of the model is generally vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Within a Bayesian
framework, policy is treated as being random and since we assume that the volatility
of the unconventional monetary policy shock follows a random walk, this argument
proves to be even stronger (Primiceri, 2005). However, to assess whether our find-
ings are indeed robust with respect to the Lucas critique, we also performed the same
counterfactual exercise by manipulating the historical structural shocks such that the
shadow rate is kept at the ZLB. Consistent with Baumeister and Benati (2013), the
20The corresponding figures can be obtained from the authors.
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results stay relatively robust, with only minor quantitative alterations across countries
and variables.21
Figure 11 reports the posterior distribution of the difference between the counterfac-
tual path and the actual realization of a given variable. The dark blue line corresponds
to the median difference and the light (dark) orange areas correspond to the 16th (25th)
and 84th (75th) credible sets.
The first column on the left side of Fig. 11 reports the case of the US. On average,
unconventional monetary policy actions reflect a long lasting expansionary monetary
policy. If the Fed would have kept the interest rate at the zero lower bound without
implementing any quantitative easing, then, on average, the growth rate in house prices,
residential investments, mortgage lending and consumption would have been sharply
lower as compared to the actual realization. In addition, inflation would have also been
lower, indicating that QE introduced additional upward pressure on prices.
The central and rightmost columns of Fig. 11 presents the results for the UK, JP
and the EA. The findings described for the US carry over to all economies under consid-
eration, suggesting that unconventional monetary policy actions helped to mitigate the
detrimental impact of the financial crisis on several macroeconomic quantities. More
specifically, unconventional monetary policy increased inflation, consumption growth,
housing prices and residential investment across all countries considered. Moreover, it
also provided at least some liquidity to the private sector. However, the impact seems
to be most pronounced in the US as compared to the other economies.
The final row of Fig. 11 depicts the difference between the estimated shadow rate
and the short-term policy rate. The difference has been negative until the beginning
of 2008, turning positive already in the beginning of 2009, meaning that the estimated
shadow rate reached negative values after the announcements of QE, reflecting the
pronounced shift towards accommodative monetary policy. The only exception is the
EA, where the shadow rate has been positive well into 2011, turning negative after the
QE announcements in 2011.
To sum up, our counterfactual exercise shows that during periods of monetary policy
tightening, housing variables have reached higher values relative to levels obtained if
the BoE, BoJ and ECB had done nothing in terms of quantitative easing and forward
guidance. The impact of QE on housing variables has been slightly higher with the
QE2 implementation in 2011. Probably this reflects the fact that economic agents
respond to QE with some lag and that they perceive less policy uncertainty in the
market. Residential investments have been stimulated more in the UK, where the
BoE’s policy measures have been successful in increasing it by about 10%, while the
BoJ managed to increase residential investment by only 0.8%. On the other hand,
the BoJ has been more successful in stimulating household indebtedness, leading to
increases of around 3%, while the BoE and ECB managed to increase this variable at
an average rate of 0.2%. Also consumption and inflation display higher growth rates
due to the different implementations of QE, showing no discernible differences across
21The specific results are available on request.
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countries. We conclude this section by noting that between 2007 and 2014, all four
Central Banks have been quite successful in mitigating the consequences of the crisis
on the housing market by successfully implementing unconventional monetary policy,
but less success can be attributed to the impact of UMP on housing markets in the
other economies.
[Fig. 11 about here.]
6 Closing Remarks
We estimate a time-varying vector autoregressive model coupled with stochastic volatil-
ity for the housing market during periods of the ZLB for the US, the UK, JP and the
EA. In our estimation, we include the shadow interest rate estimated by Krippner
(2013b), because these estimated rates tend to provide a broader measure of monetary
policy adopted by various central banks.
Our findings suggest that an increase in the shadow interest rate by 25 basis points
generates a decrease in housing prices, residential investment, consumption, CPI and
mortgage lending. The monetary policy shock displays a significant amount of time
variation, providing some evidence in favour of our time-varying parameter model in
order to capture changes in the transmission mechanisms and the volatility of policy
shocks. The results show that tightening monetary policy shocks are significantly larger
in the US than in the other countries under consideration. Moreover, we find limited
evidence that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the housing market
has changed with the implementation of unconventional monetary policies.
Furthermore, we evaluate the stance of monetary policy by performing a counter-
factual exercise. We ask if the values of housing variables would have been different
if the central banks had been inactive since the financial crisis, i.e. had not imple-
mented policies of quantitative easing or forward guidance and left the policy rate at
the ZLB. To this end we “zero-out” the structural coefficients of the monetary pol-
icy rule and investigate what would have happened if the central bank was indeed
constrained by the ZLB. We find that for all countries under scrutiny, unconventional
monetary policy actions succeeded in mitigating the detrimental effect of the financial
crisis on all macroeconomic quantities considered. Unconventional monetary policy ef-
fectively averted deflationary tendencies, increased consumption and several housing
variables significantly.
Finally, we perform a robustness exercise where we compare the results from our
benchmark model coupled with the shadow interest rate proposed by Krippner (2013b)
with an identification strategy akin to the simulation exercise performed in Baumeis-
ter and Benati (2013) and Walentin (2014). Our results display a striking similarity
between both approaches and we therefore conclude that the shadow interest rate pro-
posed by Krippner (2013b) proves to be a trustable measure to investigate unconven-
tional monetary policy.
16
References
Altavilla, C., D. Giannone, and M. Lenza (2014): “The financial and macroe-
conomic effects of OMT announcements,” .
Baumeister, C., and L. Benati (2013): “Unconventional monetary policy and the
great recession: estimating the macroeconomic effects of a spread compression at
the zero lower bound,” International Journal of Central Banking 9 (2), 165-212.
Bernanke, B. S., J. Boivin, and P. Eliasz (2005): “Measuring the Effects of
Monetary Policy: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 387–422.
Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler (1995): “Inside the Black Box: The Credit
Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4),
27–48.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “The financial acceler-
ator in a quantitative business cycle framework,” Handbook of macroeconomics, 1,
1341–1393.
Canova, F., and G. De Nicolo (2002): “Monetary disturbances matter for business
fluctuations in the G-7,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(6), 1131–1159.
Carroll, C., and W. Dunn (1997): “Unemployment expectations, jumping (S, s)
triggers, and household balance sheets,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997,
Volume 12, pp. 165–230. MIT Press.
Chen, H., V. Cu´rdia, and A. Ferrero (2012): “The Macroeconomic Effects of
Large-scale Asset Purchase Programmes*,” The economic journal, 122(564), F289–
F315.
Chung, H., J.-p. Laforte, D. Reifschneider, and J. C. Williams (2012):
“Have we underestimated the likelihood and severity of zero lower bound events?,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(s1), 47–82.
Cogley, T., and T. J. Sargent (2005): “Drifts and volatilities: monetary policies
and outcomes in the post WWII US,” Review of Economic dynamics, 8(2), 262–302.
Del Negro, M., G. B. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero, and N. Kiyotaki (2011):
“The great escape? A quantitative evaluation of the Fed?s liquidity facilities,” A
Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed?s Liquidity Facilities (October 1, 2011). FRB of
New York Staff Report, (520).
Den Haan, W. J., and V. Sterk (2011): “The Myth of Financial Innovation and
the Great Moderation*,” The Economic Journal, 121(553), 707–739.
Erceg, C., and A. Levin (2006): “Optimal monetary policy with durable consump-
tion goods,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(7), 1341–1359.
Gambacorta, L., B. Hofmann, and G. Peersman (2014): “The Effectiveness
of Unconventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country
Analysis,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(4), 615–642.
Goodhart, C., and B. Hofmann (2008): “House prices, money, credit, and the
macroeconomy,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(1), 180–205.
Guerrieri, L., and M. Iacoviello (2014): “Collateral Constraints and Macroeco-
17
nomic Asymmetries,” Working paper.
Huber, F. (2016): “Density forecasting using Bayesian global vector autoregressions
with stochastic volatility,” forthcoming, International Journal of Forecasting.
Iacoviello, M. (2005): “House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy
in the business cycle,” American economic review, pp. 739–764.
Jarocin´ski, M., and F. R. Smets (2008): “House Prices and the Stance of Monetary
Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 90(July/August 2008).
Kapetanios, G., H. Mumtaz, I. Stevens, and K. Theodoridis (2012): “Assess-
ing the Economy-wide Effects of Quantitative Easing*,” The Economic Journal,
122(564), F316–F347.
Kastner, G. (2014): “Dealing with stochastic volatility in time series using the
R package stochvol,” Journal of Statistical Software. URL http://cran. r-project.
org/web/packages/stochvol/vignettes/article. pdf.
Kastner, G., and S. Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2014): “Ancillarity-sufficiency in-
terweaving strategy (ASIS) for boosting MCMC estimation of stochastic volatility
models,” Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 76, 408–423.
Kiyotaki, N., J. Moore, et al. (1997): “Credit chains,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 105(21), 211–248.
Koop, G., R. Leon-Gonzalez, and R. W. Strachan (2009): “On the evolution
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 33(4), 997–1017.
Korobilis, D. (2013): “Assessing the Transmission of Monetary Policy Using Time-
varying Parameter Dynamic Factor Models*,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 75(2), 157–179.
Krippner, L. (2012): “Modifying Gaussian term structure models when interest rates
are near the zero lower bound,” Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper,
(2012/02).
(2013a): “Measuring the stance of monetary policy in zero lower bound envi-
ronments,” Economics Letters, 118(1), 135–138.
(2013b): “A tractable framework for zero-lower-bound Gaussian term struc-
ture models,” .
Lambertini, L., C. Mendicino, and M. T. Punzi (2013): “Expectation-driven
cycles in the housing market: Evidence from survey data,” Journal of Financial
Stability, 9(4), 518–529.
Lenza, M., H. Pill, and L. Reichlin (2010): “Monetary policy in exceptional
times,” Economic Policy, 25(62), 295–339.
Lombardi, M. J., and F. Zhu (2014): “A shadow policy rate to calibrate US mon-
etary policy at the zero lower bound,” Discussion paper, Bank for International
Settlements.
Matsuyama, K. (1990): “Residential investment and the current account,” Journal
of International Economics, 28(1), 137–153.
McCarthy, J., R. W. Peach, et al. (2002): “Monetary policy transmission to
residential investment,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,
18
8(1), 139–158.
Meaning, J., and F. Zhu (2011): “The impact of recent central bank asset purchase
programmes,” International banking and financial market developments, 3, 73.
(2012): “The impact of Federal Reserve asset purchase programmes: another
twist,” BIS Quarterly Review, p. 23.
Mian, A., and A. Sufi (2011): “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and
the US Household Leverage Crisis,” American Economic Review, 101(5), 2132–56.
Musso, A., S. Neri, and L. Stracca (2011): “Housing, consumption and monetary
policy: How different are the US and the euro area?,” Journal of Banking & Finance,
35(11), 3019–3041.
Ngo, P. V. (2015): “Household leverage, housing markets, and macroeconomic fluc-
tuations,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 44, 191–207.
Primiceri, G. E. (2005): “Time varying structural vector autoregressions and mone-
tary policy,” The Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), 821–852.
Punzi, M. T., and K. Kauko (2015): “Testing the global banking glut hypothesis,”
Journal of Financial Stability, 19, 128–151.
Sa´, F., and T. Wieladek (2015): “Capital Inflows and the US Housing Boom,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47(S1), 221–256.
Sims, C. A. (1992): “Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts: The effects of
monetary policy,” European Economic Review, 36(5), 975–1000.
Sims, C. A., and T. Zha (2006): “Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary
Policy?,” The American Economic Review, 96(1), pp. 54–81.
Uhlig, H. (2005): “What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results from
an agnostic identification procedure,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2), 381–
419.
Vargas-Silva, C. (2008): “Monetary policy and the US housing market: A VAR
analysis imposing sign restrictions,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 30(3), 977–990.
Walentin, K. (2014): “Business cycle implications of mortgage spreads,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 67, 62–77.
Wu, J. C., and F. D. Xia (2015): “Measuring the macroeconomic impact of mone-
tary policy at the zero lower bound,” forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking.
19
Table 1: Identification restrictions
Unconventional monetary policy shock
RCC P Shadow Rate HPI RB RIH Spread
AD − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ X
AS − + + ∗ ∗ ∗ X
UMP − − + − − − X
Spread shock
RCC P SR HPI RB RIH Spread
AD − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
AS − + + ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MP − − + − − − +
Spread − − 0 − − − −
Notes: The table presents the sign restrictions imposed for an aggregate de-
mand (AD), aggregate supply (AS), monetary policy (MP) and unconventional
monetary policy shock (UMP). All restrictions are imposed on impact only. Re-
sponses marked with ∗ are left unrestricted. An X marks the exclusion of a
given variable from the model.
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Fig. 1: Data overview
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Fig. 2: Dynamic responses of US macroeconomic quantities to a 25 basis point (bp)
unconventional monetary policy shock
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15,000 iterations from the posterior distribution of impulse responses.
Fig. 4: Dynamic responses of UK macroeconomic quantities to a 25 basis point (bp)
unconventional monetary policy shock
24
H
o
u
si
n
g
p
ri
ce
s
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
:0
1−
20
07
:0
4
−
1.
0
−
0.
8
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
 
0.
0
 
0.
2
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
08
:0
1−
20
09
:0
2
−
1.
0
−
0.
8
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
 
0.
0
 
0.
2
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
09
:0
3−
20
14
:0
1
−
1.
0
−
0.
8
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
 
0.
0
 
0.
2
R
es
id
en
ti
a
l
in
v
es
tm
en
t
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
:0
1−
20
07
:0
4
−
10
.4
 
−
8.
0
 
−
5.
6
 
−
3.
2
 
−
0.
7
 
 
1.
7
 
 
4.
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
08
:0
1−
20
09
:0
2
−
10
.4
 
−
8.
0
 
−
5.
6
 
−
3.
2
 
−
0.
7
 
 
1.
7
 
 
4.
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
09
:0
3−
20
14
:0
1
−
10
.4
 
−
8.
0
 
−
5.
6
 
−
3.
2
 
−
0.
7
 
 
1.
7
 
 
4.
1
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
:0
1−
20
07
:0
4
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
08
:0
1−
20
09
:0
2
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
09
:0
3−
20
14
:0
1
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
R
ea
l
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
d
eb
t
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
:0
1−
20
07
:0
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
08
:0
1−
20
09
:0
2
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
09
:0
3−
20
14
:0
1
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
C
o
n
su
m
er
p
ri
ce
in
d
ex
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
:0
1−
20
07
:0
4
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
 
0.
2
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
08
:0
1−
20
09
:0
2
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
 
0.
2
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
09
:0
3−
20
14
:0
1
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
 
0.
0
 
0.
0
 
0.
1
 
0.
1
 
0.
2
N
o
te
s:
P
os
te
ri
or
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
of
im
p
u
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
s
av
er
ag
ed
ac
ro
ss
th
re
e
se
le
ct
ed
ti
m
e
p
er
io
d
s
fo
r
th
e
U
K
.
A
ll
fi
g
u
re
s
re
p
o
rt
m
ed
ia
n
re
sp
o
n
se
s
(i
n
d
ar
k
b
lu
e)
al
on
g
w
it
h
th
e
16
th
(2
5t
h
)
an
d
84
th
(7
5t
h
)
cr
ed
ib
le
se
ts
in
li
gh
t
(d
ar
k
)
or
a
n
ge
ac
ro
ss
ti
m
e.
T
h
e
re
sp
o
n
se
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
5
,0
0
0
d
ra
w
s
fr
om
a
to
ta
l
ch
ai
n
of
15
,0
00
d
ra
w
s.
F
ig
.
5
:
S
el
ec
te
d
d
y
n
am
ic
re
sp
on
se
s
of
U
K
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
to
a
25
b
as
is
p
oi
n
t
(b
p
)
u
n
co
n
ve
n
ti
on
al
m
on
et
ar
y
p
ol
ic
y
sh
o
ck
.
25
Housing prices
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990
1996
2002
2008
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
Residential investment
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990
1996
2002
2008
−1.0
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
Real household debt
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990
1996
2002
2008
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
Consumption
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990
1996
2002
2008
−0.25
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
Consumer price index
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990
1996
2002
2008
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
Notes : Posterior median of impulse responses. Results based on 5,000 draws from a total chain of
15,000 iterations from the posterior distribution of impulse responses.
Fig. 6: Dynamic responses of Japanese macroeconomic quantities to a 25 basis point
(bp) unconventional monetary policy shock
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Fig. 8: Dynamic responses of EA macroeconomic quantities to a 25 basis point (bp)
unconventional monetary policy shock
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Appendix A Data appendix
Table A.1: Definitions and Sources of Data
Data Country Definition Source
Real Consumption US Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Bureau of Economic Analysis
UK Real Private Consumption Expenditures Bank of England
Japan Real Private Consumption Expenditures Bank of Japan
EA Real Private Consumption Expenditures ECB
Consumer Price Index US Consumer Price Index Bureau of Economic Analysis
UK Harmonized Index of Consumer Price Eurostat
Japan Consumer Price Index Bank of Japan
EA Harmonized Index of Consumer Price ECB
GDP Deflator US GDP Deflator Bureau of Economic Analysis
UK GDP Deflator Bank of England
Japan GDP Deflator Bank of Japan
EA GDP Deflator ECB
Real Residential Investment US Real Private Residential Fixed Investment Bureau of Economic Analysis
UK House Building: Permanent Dwellings Started and Completed Bank of England
Japan Real Private Residential Fixed Investment Bank of Japan
Real House Price Index US Real Residential Property Prices, Existing Dwellings Bank of International Settlement
UK Real Residential Property Prices, Existing Dwellings Bank of International Settlement
Japan Real Residential Property Prices, New and Existing Dwellings Bank of International Settlement
EA Real Residential Property Prices, New and Existing Dwellings Bank of International Settlement
Real Home Mortgage Loans US Real Home Mortgages Liabilities of Households and Nonprofit Organizations Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve
UK Real Loans Secured on Dwellings Bank of England
Japan Real Loans to Households for House Purchases Bank of Japan
EA Real Loans to Households for House Purchases ECB
Shadow Interest Rate US Shadow Interest Rate Krippner index
UK Shadow Interest Rate Krippner index
Japan Shadow Interest Rate Krippner index
EA Shadow Interest Rate Krippner index
Long Term Interest Rate US 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate Federal Reserve System
UK Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year OECD
Japan Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year OECD
EA Harmonized Long-Term Interest Rate ECB
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Appendix B A taxonomy of unconventional monetary policy
Table B.1: Implementation of Unconventional Monetary Policy
US Date Actions
QE1 November 2008 Purchased $ 1.75 trillion in long-term Treasuries as well as debt issued
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and fixed-rate mortgage backed
securities (MBS) guaranteed by those agencies.
QE2 November 2010 Purchases of $ 600 billion in long-term Treasuries, ended in June 2011.
QE3 September 2012 Purchase $40 billion in agency-backed MBS per month until economic
conditions improved substantially.
UK Date Actions
QE1 March 2009 Initial purchase of GBP 75 billion of assets over 3 months financed
by issuance of central bank reserves. Purchases increased over
subsequent months to GBP 200 billion, completed in January 2010.
QE2 October 2011 Purchases of further GBP125 billion, completed in May 2012.
QE3 July 2012 Additional GBP50 billion to be completed in November 2012.
ECB Date Actions
CBPP 1 July 2009 Purchases of EUR60 billion of euro-denominated covered bonds
(through the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP)).
CBPP 2 November 2011 A second CBPP was launched and was supposed to buy 40 billion of
covered bonds. However when the program was interrupted in October
2012, only EUR16,4 billion had been purchased.
SMP 1 May 2010 Securities Markets Program (SMP): purchases of Portuguese, Irish and
Greek government bonds.
SMP 2 August 2011 Securities Markets Program (SMP): purchases of Spanish and Italian
government bonds.
OMT 1 September 2012 Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program: purchases of sovereign
bonds with a maturity of up to 3 years in the secondary markets.
Forward Guidance July 2013 Promise to keep low interest rates for an extended period of time.
Japan Date Actions
QE1 March 2001 Bank reserve target increased from 5 trillion yen to 3235 trillion yen, with purchase of government bonds amounting to 18 trillion.
Credit Easing March 2001 Purchase of ABS (Asset-Backed Securities), ABCP (Asset-Backed Commercial Paper) and equities from financial institutions
Comprehensive easing policy October 2010 Asset-purchase fund of 35 trillion.
Comprehensive easing policy October 2011 Previous Asset-purchase fund up to 55 trillion.
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